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Abstract: Harmon-Jones et al. (2017) make a thought-provoking suggestion in their commentary
on Zentall (2016): Overlooked biases among researchers on animal cognition might lead them to
discount the traces of higher-order cognition in animals they study. We find the suggestion both
philosophically important and worth further reflection for animal scientists. Harmon-Jones et al.
point to two “cognitive dissonance” biases involving the clash between the common human
resistance to viewing ourselves as animals/meat-eaters and how these biases might lead to
discounting possible advanced cognitive performances in the animals studied. We show how these
biases might appear in cognitive research generally and argue for further study on their effects.
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In their commentary on Zentall (2016), Harmon-Jones et al. (2017) suggest the possibility of
hidden biases among scientists that would lead them to “downplaying the similarities that we
share with nonhuman animals.” They note that such biases might be seen as a kind of cognitive
dissonance — in this case, a clash between the belief that nonhuman animals display advanced
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cognitive behavior (such as cognitive dissonance) and the belief that such higher order cognition
only occurs in humans. In this commentary we will explore the possibility of such hidden biases,
taking the possibility seriously and following the pathway a bit further.
Harmon-Jones et al. mention two kinds of beliefs that may, independently or jointly,
interfere with good scientific judgment about research on animal cognition. The first kind stems
from human resistance to being reminded of our vulnerability and mortality, which may
contribute to undue skepticism about animal mentality. The second, from scientific studies of the
psychology of meat-eating, shows, “a strong negative relationship between attributed mind and
edibility” (Longhnan, Bastian & Haslam, 2014; Piazza & Loughnan, 2016).
As to the first source of dissonance, fear of mortality (Becker, 1973), it is certainly possible
that scientists are unconsciously influenced by this kind of existential anxiety as they examine
how close to human cognition non-humans can come. Some Philosophers (Cavell, 2008) have
singled out this shared vulnerability as the moral center of their argument for serious
consideration of justice for animals. Regarding this human sense of vulnerability, the work on the
“uncanny valley” in artificial intelligence, where a certain amount of “unease” occurs in human
subjects toward robots the more they look like humans (Katsyri, Forger, Makarainen & Takala,
2015), may have some relevance to research on terror management (Hayes et al. 2010). However,
as Harmon-Jones et al. (2017) point out, the introduction of “scientific jargon” and consistency
with subjects’ introductory psychology courses seems to lessen anxiety about facing the fact that
humans are animals (Goldenberg, 2001).
The second source of dissonance, edibility, is much closer to concerns about denial of
human-like mentality in animals. Loughnan et al. (2010) have examined the mental perturbations
caused by what they call the “meat paradox”: “people simultaneously dislike hurting animals and
like eating meat” (p. 156). One way humans live with this clash of beliefs and desires is to
“suppress their moral concern for animals” (p. 156) when they eat meat. Since “people generally
believe that animals should be afforded moral consideration because they possess ... mental
capacities” (p. 157), this may create cognitive dissonance in scientific research on animal
mentality.1
This particular form of cognitive dissonance has not gone unnoticed in the history of
Western thought. The father of the idea that animals are merely fleshly machines, Rene
Descartes, in a moment of candor, admits that one of the sources of resistance to the belief that
animals have minds is the fact that humans eat them (Regan, 1989, p. 69; see also Marino,
2017a,b, on chicken cognition).
More conceptual and empirical work is needed on whether cognitive dissonance
influences research on animal cognition. Are there vegan skeptics about animal cognition? Or
speciesists who are animal cognition enthusiasts? We know of at least one student of dog
cognition who describes himself as an “unabashed speciesist” (Berns, 2017, p. 8; cf. Cook et al.
2018).
Longhnan et al. (2014) cite studies suggesting that “People not only judge humanlike
[emphasis ours] animals as more pain sensitive but also experience greater autonomic arousal
1

Perhaps participating in the actual pursuit of animal mentality brings out the dissonance that was weakened in the
passive, distanced, reception by college students of the scientific findings presented by Goldenberg et al. (2001).
Further research is needed to explain how the “meat paradox” might affect the same person differentially, first as
first-year college student and then, later in life, as an animal researcher.
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when watching them being mistreated” (p. 106). Perhaps the more animal cognition looks like
ours, the less likely that we will accept it without anthropodenial. The research on theory of mind
shows that resisting the need to distance ourselves from animality yields more accurate scientific
judgment. Experimental research on theory of mind in nonhuman animals has at times fallen into
the trap of assessing nonhuman animal cognition using human criteria (e.g., Premack & Woodruff,
1978; see Povinell & Vonk, 2003, for a similar critique). Some have cited apes’ failure on humanoriented false belief tasks as evidence against their having a theory of mind (Call & Tomasello,
1999; O’Connell & Dunbar 2003; Kaminski, Call & Tomasello 2008; Krachun, Carpenter, Call &
Tomasello 2009; Krachun, Carpenter, Call & Tomasello 2010).
Human theory of mind — and more globally, human cognition — is often viewed as a gold
standard to which all other forms of cognition are to be compared. But perhaps our desire to
understand non-human theory of mind (or simply non-human social cognition) in human terms
obscures the “alien” nature of animal cognition. False beliefs may be less relevant in non-human
social cognition (Andrews, 2005; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Martin & Santos, 2016; Povinelli & Vonk
2003).
A different perspective on this question can be seen in comparative work on memory.
Many species of birds perform feats of memory2 that dwarf human memory capacity. For
example, Clark’s nutcrackers live in the highest elevation of the San Francisco Peaks, a habitat
with harsh winter conditions and food shortages (Balda & Kamil, 2006). Throughout autumn,
Clark’s nutcrackers may cache up to 33,000 seeds in 7,000 unique cache sites (Vander Wall &
Balda, 1977); 80% of searches result in recovered caches (Tomback, 1980; Turek & Kelso, 1968).
These birds accomplish this even though they spend fewer than 30 seconds caching at each site
and may not return to the cache site for many months. This capacity is even more impressive
considering that the birds must remember the locations despite sometimes drastic changes to
the substrate and even possible elimination of landmarks: they cache in greenery and retrieve in
snow. This allows them to survive harsh winters and even to breed earlier in the spring so their
offspring face less competition and have time to grow larger and stronger by the time the next
winter comes around (Balda & Kamil, 2006). It would clearly be pointless, ethologically, to try to
assess the cognitive virtuosity of Clark’s nutcrackers in terms of human kinds of memory skills.
Although the commentary of Harmon-Jones et al. that sparked this modest elaboration
might seem a small point in the research on animal cognitive dissonance, it reminds us that our
anthropocentric tendency to relativize nonhuman cognition to human cognition is a cognitive bias
that can distort human judgment as surely as other human cognitive biases can (Fischoff, 1982;
Kahneman, 2003; Larrick, 2004; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson & Kunda, 1983; Stanovich, 1999).
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